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Tohono O’odham Nation v. City of Glendale, 804 F.3d 1292 (9th Cir.
2015)
Kathryn S. Ore
Tohono O’odham Nation v. City of Glendale is a reminder of the
tension between state governments and the federal government. It also
reflects continued unease with tribal gaming policies. The Ninth Circuit
reiterated the longstanding federal preemption doctrine to override the
State of Arizona and City of Glendale’s attempted circumvention of the
Gila River Bend Indian Reservation Land Replacement Act. In doing so,
the court prevented state legislation from undermining the Tohono
O’odham Nation’s ability to obtain replacement lands for its reservation.
I. INTRODUCTION
The primary issue in Tohono O’odham Nation v. City of
Glendale was whether the Gila Bend Indian Reservation Lands
Replacement Act (“Act”) preempted an Arizona law, House Bill 2534
(“H.B. 2534”), which permitted a city or town to annex certain
neighboring unincorporated lands.1 The Act allows the Tohono O’odham
Nation (“Nation”) to purchase replacement reservation lands and request
the federal government take them into trust.2 Replacement reservation
lands must be located outside the corporate limits of any city or town.3
The United States District Court for the District of Arizona held the Act
preempted H.B. 2534 and granted summary judgment to the Nation.4
Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the district court holding and ruled that H.B. 2534 was a “clear
and manifest obstacle to the purpose of the Act.”5
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Nation primarily descends from American Indians who lived
along Gila River in Arizona.6 President Chester A. Arthur issued an
1.
Tohono O’odham Nation v. City of Glendale, 804 F.3d 1292, 1293
(9th Cir. 2015).
2.
Id. at 1294; see also Gila Bend Indian Reservation Lands
Replacement Act, Pub. L. No. 99-503, § 6, 100 Stat. 1798 (1986).
3.
Pub. L. No. 99-503, § 6.
4.
Tohono O’odham Nation, 804 F.3d at 1296-97.
5.
Id. at 1300-01.
6.
Id. at 1294.
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executive order in 1882 setting aside the Gila Bend Indian Reservation
(“Reservation”) in southwestern Arizona.7 In 1960, the federal
government completed construction of the Painted Rock Dam (“Dam”)
approximately ten miles downstream from the Gila Bend Reservation.8
Over the next several decades, the Reservation lands were rendered
“economically unviable” by repeated flooding caused by the Dam.9 To
remedy the situation, the Nation petitioned Congress for new lands.10
Congress recognized its trust responsibility to allocate suitable lands for
the Nation, and passed the 1986 Gila Bend Indian Reservation Lands
Replacement Act.11 The Act authorized the Nation to assign its lands to
the federal government in exchange for money, enabled the Nation to
purchase lands that would be held in trust by the federal government at
the request of the Nation, and released the United States from any legal
claims.12 Lands eligible for trust, however, could not be located “within
the corporate limits of any city or town.”13
In 2003, the Nation purchased a parcel of unincorporated land
surrounded by lands incorporated by the City of Glendale.14 The Nation
later requested a portion of the purchased lands “be taken into trust
pursuant to the Act,” and publically unveiled its plan to build a gaming
casino on that land (“Parcel 2”).15 The Secretary of the Interior
(“Secretary”) reviewed the Nation’s request and determined Parcel 2
“satisfied all the legal requirements of the Act.”16 This determination was
based on the Secretary’s conclusion that under the “plain and
jurisdictional meaning of ‘corporate limits,’” Parcel 2 was not located
“within the corporate limits of any city or town.”17
The State of Arizona and the City of Glendale (collectively
“Defendants”) joined others to file lawsuits against the Department of the
Interior in response to the Nation’s trust application and plan to build a
gaming casino, alleging violations of the Administrative Procedure Act,

7.
Id.
8.
Id.; see also Gila River Indian Community v. United States, 729
F.3d 1139, 1142 (9th Cir. 2013).
9.
Tohono O’odham Nation, 804 F.3d at 1294.
10.
Id.
11.
Id.; see also Pub. L. No. 99-503.
12.
Tohono O’odham Nation, 804 F.3d at 1294; see Pub. L. No. 99-503,
§ 6.
13.
Id.
14.
Tohono O’odham Nation, 804 F.3d at 1294.
15.
Id. at 1294-95.
16.
Id. at 1295.
17.
Id.
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the United States Constitution, and the Arizona Constitution.18 The
Nation intervened, and the suits were consolidated, styled as Gila River
Indian Community v. United States.19 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit
determined the phrase “within corporate limits” was ambiguous and
requested the Secretary “consider the phrase in light of the [identified]
ambiguity.”20 The Secretary reaffirmed its early interpretation, and on
July 7, 2014, the federal government took Parcel 2 into trust.21
While the district court proceedings for Gila River Indian
Community were pending, Arizona enacted H.B. 2534.22 H.B. 2534
provided that a town or city could annex property surrounded, or
partially surrounded, by incorporated lands, if the property owner
“submitted a request to the federal government to . . . hold the [property]
in trust.”23 The Nation responded by filing a lawsuit against Defendants,
alleging the Act preempted H.B. 2534, and H.B. 2534 violated the due
process and equal protection clauses of the United States and Arizona
Constitutions.24 Additionally, the Nation asserted H.B. 2534 violated
Arizona’s constitutional prohibition on special legislation.25
The district court entered a judgment confirming the Act
preempted H.B. 2534 because it directly conflicted with Congress’s
intent to enable the Nation’s lands to be put in trust.26 The court denied
the Nation’s due process claim, holding the Nation failed to show H.B.
2534 was “clearly arbitrary and unreasonable and unconnected to a
legitimate state interest.”27 It further denied the Nation’s equal protection
claim, finding H.B. 2534 withstood rational-basis review.28 Additionally,
the court held the Nation had not demonstrated “beyond a reasonable
doubt that H.B. 2534 constitute[d] special legislation.”29 The parties filed
cross appeals that were consolidated into a single suit.30

18.
Id.; see also Gila River Indian Community, 729 F.3d at 1144.
19.
Tohono O’odham Nation, 804 F.3d at 1295.
20.
Id. (citing Gila River Indian Community, 729 F.3d at 1147).
21.
Id. at 1296.
22.
Id.
23.
Id.; see Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 9-471.04 (2011) (preempted by Tohono
O’odham Nation, 804 F.3d 1292).
24.
Tohono O’odham Nation, 804 F.3d at 1296.
25.
Id.
26.
Id.
27.
Id. at 1297.
28.
Id.
29.
Id.
30.
Id.
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III. ANALYSIS
The Ninth Circuit’s analysis focused solely on the Nation’s
claim that the Act preempted H.B. 2534.31 The court noted that Congress
derives its power to preempt state law from the Supremacy Clause of the
United States Constitution.32 Preemption is divided into express, field,
and conflict preemption.33 Here, the Nation asserted “obstacle
preemption,” a type of conflict preemption.34 Obstacle preemption occurs
where “a challenged state law ‘stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.’”35 Courts focus on “two bedrock principles” when conducting
preemption analysis: first, the evaluation of congressional purpose; and
second, the assumption that states’ police powers should not be
superseded unless that was the “clear and manifest purpose of
Congress.”36 These principles amount to a presumption against
preemption.37
Despite the presumption, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
court’s finding that the Act preempted H.B. 2534.38 In doing so, the
Ninth Circuit examined “the ‘purpose and intended effects’ of the Act,”
as well as the effect of H.B. 2534.39 Congress passed the Act to
compensate the Nation for destroying its initially reserved lands by
facilitating “replacement of reservation lands with lands suitable for
sustained economic use.”40 The Act accomplished Congress’s intent by
enabling the Nation to purchase land and incorporate it into tribal land by
requesting the federal government hold it in trust.41
Under the Act, the federal government is required to take eligible
land into trust if it meets several conditions.42 First, the Nation must

31.
32.

Id. at 1297-1301.
Id. at 1297 (internal citations omitted); see U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.

2.
33.
Tohono O’odham Nation, 804 F.3d at 1297 (citing Kurns v. R.R.
Friction Products Corp., 132 S. Ct. 1261, 1265-66 (2012)).
34.
Id.
35.
Id. (quoting Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363,
373 (2000) (internal citation omitted)).
36.
Id. at 1297-98 (citing Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009)).
37.
Id. at 1298.
38.
Id.
39.
Id. (quoting Crosby, 530 U.S. at 373.)
40.
Id. (quoting Pub. L. No. 99-503, § 2(3).
41.
Id. (citing Pub. L. No. 99-503, § 6(c)-(d)).
42.
Id. at 1299 (citing Pub. L. No. 99-503, § 6(d)).
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request the Secretary take the purchased land into trust.43 The land must
also meet three criteria before it can be taken into trust: first, it cannot be
located outside of the designated counties; second, it cannot be located
“within the corporate limits of any city or town”; and third, it must
“constitute[] not more than three separate areas consisting of contiguous
tracts, at least one of which areas shall be continuous to San Lucy
Village.”44
Defendants did not dispute that the Nation’s trust request met the
requirements of the Act.45 Rather, they challenged the district court’s
ruling that the Act preempted H.B. 2534.46 Defendants specifically
challenged the district court’s interpretation that the phrase “at the
request of the Tribe” meant lands must be incorporated at the time of the
request to be considered ineligible.47 The Ninth Circuit determined the
precise time when the Secretary assessed incorporation did not affect its
preemption analysis.48 Therefore, it was unnecessary to decide the
issue.49
According to the Ninth Circuit’s preemption analysis, H.B. 2534
“clearly st[ood] as an obstacle to the implementation of the Act.”50 In
effect, at the exact moment the Nation requested the Secretary hold
purchased replacement lands in trust under the Act, the City of Glendale
was authorized to “effectively veto [the] application” by preemptively
rendering the land ineligible through annexation.51 Such action would
block the trust application and “directly bar[] the Nation’s effort to
incorporate purchased lands into tribal land.”52
IV. CONCLUSION
Tohono O’odham Nation exemplifies a careful analysis under the
federal preemption doctrine, and more specifically, the application of
obstacle preemption. Arizona’s attempt to circumvent the Act by
enacting H.B. 2534 highlights the discord that often emerges between
state governments and the federal government with regard to American
Indian policy. The Ninth Circuit’s holding, therefore, serves as a
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1300.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1299.
Id. at 1300.
Id.
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reminder of the unique relationship between the federal government and
American Indian tribes. Additionally, by restricting its analysis to the
federal preemption doctrine, the court avoided deciding whether H.B.
2534 violated the United States and Arizona Constitutions, and instead
left those issues for a potential future case.

